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Abstract
Most computer science research is aimed at solving dif-
ficult problems with a goal of sharing the developed so-
lutions with the greater research community. For many
researchers, a project ends when the paper is published
even though a much broader impact could be achieved
by spending additional effort to transition that research
to real world usage. In this paper, we examine the op-
portunities and challenges in transitioning Tor research
through a case study of deploying a previously proposed
application layer socket scheduling policy called KIST
into the Tor network. We implement KIST, simulate it in
a 2,000-relay private Tor network using Shadow, deploy
it on a Tor relay running in the public Tor network, and
measure its performance impact. Confirming the results
reported in prior research, we find that KIST reduces
kernel outbound queuing times for relays and download
times for low-volume or bursty clients. We also find
that client and relay performance with KIST increases
as network load and packet loss rates increase, although
the effects of packet loss on KIST were overlooked in
past work. Our implementation will be released as open-
source software for inclusion in a future Tor release.
1 Introduction
Tor [2, 8] is the most popular system for anonymous
communication, consisting of roughly 7,500 volunteer-
operated relays transferring over 100 Gbit of traffic ev-
ery second [3]. Tor has roughly two million unique daily
users [3], over 500,000 of which use Tor at any given
time [14]. Clients using Tor construct circuits of three
Tor relays through which they tunnel their Internet con-
nections, while a hidden onion service protocol allows
both clients and servers to create circuits and connect
them inside of the Tor network in order for both end-
points to achieve end-to-end encryption and anonymity.
Tor is designed to provide low-latency anonymity: re-
lays immediately forward packets without introducing
any artificial delays in order to provide a usable experi-
ence for clients that use Tor to browse Internet websites.
However, Tor’s three relay-hop design (six relay-hops for
hidden onion services) combined with its popularity and
available resources results in significantly longer transfer
times compared to direct connections.
There has been a significant amount of research into
performance enhancements for the Tor network [6], in-
cluding proposals that change the way Tor relays clas-
sify [4, 15] and prioritize [12, 18] traffic and handle re-
lay connections [5, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17]. Relays currently
use the circuit scheduling approach of Tang and Gold-
berg [18]: an exponentially-weighted moving average
(EWMA) of the throughput of each circuit is used to pri-
oritize low-volume, bursty traffic over high-volume, bulk
traffic. Jansen et al. identified flaws in the way that re-
lays write data to the kernel that were significantly re-
ducing the effectiveness of the intended priority mech-
anisms, and proposed a new socket scheduling policy
called Kernel-Informed Socket Transport (KIST) to over-
come these challenges [12]. A KIST prototype was eval-
uated in Tor network simulations using Shadow [1, 13]
and was shown to reduce kernel outbound queuing times
and end-to-end latency for low-volume traffic; however,
it was never tested or evaluated on any relays running in
the live, public Tor network.
In this paper, we present our work in further under-
standing the impact that KIST has on client and relay
performance, with the goal of producing a production-
level implementation of KIST that is suitable to include
in a future Tor release. Toward this goal, we first in-
dependently implement KIST in collaboration with the
Tor developers: we discuss the details of this implemen-
tation and the supporting architecture in Section 3. Our
KIST implementation improves upon the previous proto-
type [12] by significantly reducing the overhead involved
in managing the process of writing to sockets, and con-
tains the components that would be required for our code
to be included in Tor (e.g., unit tests and documentation).
We then simulate KIST in a large scale private Tor
network of 2,000 relays and up to 70,000 clients using
Shadow [1, 13], both to test our code and to confirm past
research [12] reporting that KIST is capable of improv-
ing performance for Tor relays and clients. Our results in
Section 4 confirm the results from prior work: KIST is
capable of relocating congestion from the kernel output
queue into Tor where it can be better managed and pri-
ority can be properly applied. Additionally, the effects
of packet loss on KIST were not considered in prior re-
search; we extend that research by analyzing KIST under
a range of network load and packet loss models. We find
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that KIST performs at least as well as the default Tor
scheduler across all tested conditions, and that KIST is
able to increasingly improve both client and relay per-
formance relative to Tor’s default scheduler as both net-
work load and packet loss rates increase. We provide the
first indication that KIST effectively backs off of high-
volume circuits under high loss while correctly prioritiz-
ing low-volume or bursty circuits.
We also provide the first live-network evaluation of
KIST in Section 5, using a deployment of KIST on a
fast relay in the public Tor network. We find that Tor ap-
plication queuing time increases with KIST as expected;
however, we are unable to detect a significant change in
relay throughput or kernel outbound queuing time that
can be attributed to KIST. We believe that this is par-
tially due to our lack of experimental control over Tor
network effects, and partially because our relay did not
experience enough load or packet loss for KIST to sig-
nificantly influence the socket scheduling process. We
also find that KIST overhead is tolerable: with our opti-
mizations and suggested parameter settings, the system
call overhead scales linearly with the number of relay-
to-relay TCP connections with write-pending data, and
independently of the total number of open sockets.
Finally, we briefly discuss the lessons that we learned
while producing and evaluating deployable Tor code, and
generalize our experiences to provide insights into the
process of transitioning Tor research.
2 Background
In this section we provide background on Tor and how
it handles traffic, and describe how KIST changes Tor’s
scheduling mechanisms.
2.1 Tor
Tor [8] is a low-latency anonymity network that is pri-
marily used to access and download webpages and to
transfer files [14], but can be used to facilitate anony-
mous communication between any pair of communicat-
ing peers in general.
To use Tor, a client first constructs a circuit by tele-
scoping an encrypted connection through an entry re-
lay, a middle relay, and an exit relay, and then requests
the exit relay to connect to the desired external desti-
nations on the client’s behalf. The logical connections
made by clients to destinations are called streams, and
they are multiplexed over circuits according to the policy
set by each circuit’s exit relay. The client and the exit re-
lay package all application-layer payloads into 512-byte
cells, which are onion-encrypted and forwarded through
the circuit. When a client and a server communicate us-
ing the onion service protocol, they both construct cir-
cuits and connect them at a client-chosen rendezvous re-
Figure 1: Connections between Tor clients, relays, and destina-
tions. Solid black lines represent TCP connections, and dashed
orange lines represent logical streams of client application pay-
loads that are multiplexed over both the TCP connections and
the encrypted circuits that are constructed by clients. High per-
formance relays generally maintain thousands of open network
sockets as a result of this architecture.
lay; the resulting six relay-hop circuit is then used to pro-
vide end-to-end encryption.
Circuits are multiplexed over TCP connections which
are maintained between Tor clients, relays, and desti-
nations (see Figure 1). During the circuit construction
process, each relay will create a TCP connection to the
next-hop relay chosen by the client if such a connection
does not already exist. Although idle TCP connections
are closed to conserve resources, each relay may main-
tain up to n− 1 open TCP connections to other relays
for onion routing in a network consisting of n relays.
In addition to the relay TCP connections, entry relays
maintain TCP connections with clients while exit relays
initiate and maintain TCP connections with destination
servers, e.g., to download webpages and embedded ob-
jects. Therefore, high-bandwidth relays generally main-
tain thousands of open network sockets at any given time.
2.2 Tor Traffic Management
We now describe how a Tor relay internally handles and
forwards traffic prior to version 0.2.6.2-alpha, i.e.,
before merging support for KIST. We describe how this
architecture was modified to support KIST in newer ver-
sions of Tor in Section 3.
Tor’s traffic handling process involves several layers of
buffers and schedulers, and is driven by an event notifica-
tion library called libevent1 (see Figure 2). Tor registers
new sockets with libevent and uses it to asynchronously
poll those sockets in order to track when they are read-
able and writable. There is an input and output byte
buffer corresponding to each socket that is used to buffer
kernel reads and writes, respectively. There is also a cir-
cuit scheduler corresponding to each socket that is used
to prioritize traffic, as we will further describe below.
When a TCP socket is readable, i.e., has incoming
bytes that can be read from the kernel, libevent notifies
Tor by executing a callback function (Figure 2 A ). Tor
then reads input bytes from the readable TCP socket into
1http://libevent.org
2
Figure 2: Data is transferred through Tor using several layers of
buffers and queues. The transfer process is driven by libevent,
an event notification library. Circuit schedulers attempt to pri-
oritize low-volume or bursty traffic (web browsing) over high-
volume, bulk traffic (file sharing).
the input byte buffer using OpenSSL, which removes the
transport layer of encryption (Figure 2 B ). For each 512-
byte chunk that accumulates in the input buffer, Tor cre-
ates a cell, applies onion encryption to it, and then either
handles the cell directly if possible or moves it to the
circuit queue corresponding to its next-hop relay (Fig-
ure 2 C ). The cells remain in the circuit queue until they
can be written to the outgoing TCP connections.
When a TCP socket is writable, i.e., has available
space such that outgoing bytes can be written to the ker-
nel, libevent notifies Tor by executing a callback function
(Figure 2 D ). Because circuits are multiplexed over TCP
connections, there may be several circuits with cells that
are pending to be written to the writable socket; there is
a circuit scheduler corresponding to each socket that is
used to determine the order that pending cells are writ-
ten. The circuit scheduler corresponding to the writable
socket is invoked to choose the circuit with the best pri-
ority and write a cell from it to the output byte buffer
(Figure 2 E ). Tor uses the circuit scheduling algorithm
of Tang and Goldberg [18] to determine circuit priority.
Their algorithm is based on an exponentially-weighted
moving average (EWMA) of circuit throughput and pri-
oritizes circuits carrying low-volume or bursty traffic
over those carrying high-volume, bulk traffic. Bytes from
the output buffer are written to the kernel using OpenSSL
(Figure 2 F ) when the output buffer length exceeds a
threshold of 32 KiB and when circuit scheduling for the
writable socket is complete.
Note that the entire reading and writing processes are
driven by libevent, which issues readable and writable
notifications for one socket at a time. The order in which
these notifications are delivered is not configurable.
2.3 KIST
In prior work, Jansen et al. observed two major prob-
lems with Tor’s traffic management process, and de-
signed a new socket scheduler, called kernel-informed
socket transport (KIST), to correct these issues [12].
Problem: Sequential Socket Writes: Because Tor only
considers a single socket out of potentially thousands or
tens of thousands of sockets at a time, it is possible that
the circuit priority scheduler would only consider a small
fraction of the circuits that could have been written at any
given time. They showed through experimentation that
circuit priority mechanisms are ineffective when multiple
circuits of different priority levels do not share the same
outgoing socket (since then they are not considered by
the same circuit scheduler instance). Because of Tor’s
sequential, single-socket output handler, worse priority
high-volume traffic from one socket would be written to
the kernel before better priority low-volume traffic from
another socket. Additionally, the first-in-first-out kernel
scheduler would send the already-written worse-priority
data before any better-priority data that may arrive and
be written an instant later.
Solution: Global Circuit Scheduling: To correctly pri-
oritize circuits, KIST modifies the way Tor responds to
the libevent writable notifications. Rather than imme-
diately scheduling circuits and writing cells, KIST in-
stead adds the writable socket to a set of pending sockets.
KIST continues collecting this set over a configurable
time period in order to improve priority by increasing the
number of candidate circuits whose cells may be written.
At the end of the period, KIST chooses from the set of
all circuits that contain cells that are waiting to be writ-
ten to one of the sockets in the set of pending sockets.
We present the details of our implementation of this ap-
proach is Section 3.
Problem: Bloated Socket Buffers: Jansen et al. ob-
served that relays may have several thousands of TCP
sockets opened at any time, and that the size of each
of their send buffers are automatically tuned (monoton-
ically increased) by the kernel in order to ensure that
the connection can meet the bandwidth delay product
and fully utilize the link. TCP-autotuning [19] increases
throughput when few sockets are active, but was found to
cause bufferbloat and increase kernel queuing time in Tor
networks where hundreds or thousands of sockets may be
simultaneously active.
Solution: Socket Write Limits: To reduce bufferbloat,
KIST limits how much it will write to each TCP
socket based on the TCP connection’s current conges-
tion window and the number of unacknowledged pack-
ets. These values are collected from the kernel us-
ing getsockopt(2) on level SOL TCP for option
TCP INFO, and used to estimate the amount of data that
the kernel could immediately send out into the network
(i.e., it would not be throttled by TCP). KIST limits how
much it will write to a socket by the minimum of this
estimate and the amount of free space in each socket
buffer. Finally, KIST includes a global write limit across
all sockets to ensure that the amount of data written to
the kernel is not more than the network interface would
be able to send.
3
3 KIST Implementation
We now describe our implementation of KIST to sup-
port both global circuit scheduling and socket write lim-
its. We highlight optimizations that we made to the orig-
inal algorithm in order to make KIST more suitable for a
production environment.
3.1 Supporting Global Circuit Scheduling
After discussing KIST with the Tor developers, they
refactored the socket writing logic described in Sec-
tion 2.2 into a new socket scheduler that manages the
process of writing cells from the circuits to the output
buffers and the kernel (Figures 2 E and 2 F ). The Tor de-
velopers also implemented a socket scheduling policy2
that (i) runs the socket scheduler to write cells to the
kernel immediately whenever a circuit has pending cells,
and (ii) follows Tor’s previous default behavior of writ-
ing as much as possible from pending circuits to writable
sockets. We call this the “as much as possible” (AMAP)
socket scheduling policy.
Although AMAP maintains Tor’s previous functional-
ity, it also inherits its limitations. In particular, because
AMAP writes as much as possible and as often as possi-
ble, libevent essentially dictates that sockets get written
in a non-configurable order and therefore circuit priority
is ineffective. However, the new scheduling framework
allows us to fully implement KIST: it allows for the queu-
ing of writable sockets and for delaying the process of
writing to those sockets.
3.2 Supporting Socket Write Limits
We refactored Tor socket scheduling code in order to al-
low for the implementation of multiple, distinct socket
scheduling policies, and implemented KIST to limit the
amount of data that is written to the kernel.
3.2.1 KIST Implementation
Algorithm 1 presents KIST, which we implemented in
Tor 0.2.8.10 and are preparing to submit to the Tor
developers for merging into a future release. When using
KIST, the socket scheduler is executed on a configurable
repeating period.
First, KIST performs one system call for each pend-
ing socket in order to update its cache of TCP informa-
tion. In Section 5.2 we evaluate the overhead of this pro-
cess. Second, KIST chooses the socket to which it will
write using the priorityPop function, which returns the
pending socket with the best priority circuit. KIST writes
one cell from this circuit to Tor’s outbuf and immediately
flushes it to the kernel in order to maintain inter-socket
2Both the socket scheduler and the default policy were merged into
Tor version 0.2.6.2-alpha in December 2014.
Algorithm 1 The KIST socket scheduling policy.
1: Ls← getPendingSockets()
2: for s in Ls do
3: s.updateTCPIn f o()
4: end for
5: while len(Ls)> 0 do
6: s← priorityPop(Ls)
7: s.circSched. f lush(1)
8: s.writeOutbu f ToKernel()
9: if s.circSched.hasCells() and s.canWrite() then
10: priorityPush(Ls,s) {also updates priority}
11: end if
12: end while
priority and avoid the non-deterministic flush order that
is normally imposed by libevent.3
KIST then uses s.canWrite to check both that the
socket can be written to and that the write amount has
not reached the per-socket limit defined by
limit← (2 · cwnd ·mss)− (una ·mss)−notsent
where cwnd is size of the congestion window in pack-
ets, una is the number of sent but unacked packets, mss
is the maximum segment size, and notsent is the num-
ber of bytes written to the kernel that have not yet been
sent.4 This slight variation on the previously proposed
per-socket limit [12] ensures that the kernel can imme-
diately send packets in response to incoming acks rather
than waiting for Tor to write more data the next time that
the scheduler is run. If the socket can be written to and
the limit has not been reached, priorityPush returns the
socket to the pending list with its updated priority.
3.2.2 KIST Optimizations
During our implementation and testing of KIST, we
made the following observations that led us to reduce its
overhead and complexity.
Ignore Idle Sockets: Jansen et al. [12] suggested that
Tor collect information on every open socket that is con-
nected to another Tor relay. The Tor network consists of
approximately 7,500 relays [3], which serves as an upper
bound on the number of sockets that may need schedul-
ing. Our live network tests reveal a fast relay can ex-
pect to be connected to 3,000-4,000 others at any time.
However, as our overhead analysis in Section 5.2 shows,
our Tor relay never accumulated more than 127 pend-
ing sockets (those with available write-pending cells) in
a 10 millisecond period. By only updating TCP informa-
3For performance reasons, KIST actually flushes a just-written out-
put buffer to the kernel only when (i) the next scheduling decision
would cause a write to a new socket, or (ii) no pending sockets remain.
4The Linux kernel provides notsent when TCP INFO is queried
as of version 4.6 (released 2016-05-15); on older kernels, it can be
retrieved using ioctl(2) with request SIOCOUTQNSD.
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tion on these pending sockets, we can greatly reduce the
amount of time spent making system calls.
Ignore Socket Buffer Space: Jansen et al. [12] sug-
gested a per-socket write limit of the minimum between
free socket buffer space and TCP’s congestion window.
However, we found that the congestion window was the
limiting factor is the vast majority of cases. We can re-
duce the number of system calls per socket from three to
one by ignoring socket buffer space entirely. Even if the
socket buffer were to run out of space, we can expect that
the kernel will push back and propagate the socket’s non-
writable state to libevent, which will prevent Tor from
attempting to write to it.
Ignore Global Write Limit: Jansen et al. [12] sug-
gested that KIST should enforce a global write limit
across all sockets (in addition to per-socket write lim-
its). We did not implement this enforcement in order to
reduce code complexity, since our large network simu-
lations described in Section 4 show that a global write
limit is unnecessary for preventing bufferbloat given that
the per-socket limits are in place.
4 Simulation Evaluation
In this section, we describe our Tor network evaluation of
KIST and show its performance impact across a variety
of network conditions.
4.1 Private Tor Network
We evaluate KIST using Shadow [1,13], a discrete-event
network simulation framework. Shadow uses function
interposition to intercept all necessary system calls and
redirect them to their simulated counterpart, thereby em-
ulating a Linux operating system to any applications it
runs. Shadow transparently supports applications that
create threads, open UDP and TCP sockets, read and
write to sockets, perform blocking system calls, etc. Ap-
plications are compiled as position-independent executa-
bles and loaded into Shadow as plug-ins at run time, and
then directly executed for each virtual simulation node
that is configured to run it. Shadow’s strong support for
network-based distributed systems in general and Tor in
particular make it ideal for evaluating network-wide ef-
fects of new Tor algorithms.
Shadow directly executes Tor as virtual processes that
are connected through a simulated network. Although a
Tor process will attempt to connect to the live, public Tor
network by default, we utilize Tor’s private Tor network
configuration option to create a network with our own re-
lays, clients, and servers—all hosted within the Shadow
simulation framework and without direct Internet access.
Virtual Hosts: We generated a private Tor network using
the methods of Jansen et al. [11] and public Tor metrics
data from 2017-01. Our base configuration included a
total of 2,000 Tor relays, 49,800 Tor clients, and 5,000
file servers. The client behavior is as follows. Each of
300 ShadowPerf clients downloads a 50 KiB, 1 MiB, or
5 MiB file and pauses 60-120 seconds before repeating
the download on a new circuit. This behavior mimics
the TorPerf download pattern that is used in the public
Tor network to benchmark performance over time [3],
and allows us to understand the fidelity to the public Tor
network. Each of 1495 bulk clients repeatedly download
5 MiB files without pausing, while each of the 48,005
web clients download 320 KiB files and pause for a time
between 1 and 60 seconds (chosen uniformly at random)
before downloading another file.
Internet Model: Shadow uses a connected graph to
represent the Internet paths between virtual simulation
hosts. Vertices in the graph correspond to Internet routers
to which a host can be connected while edges correspond
to paths between routers and contain latency and packet
loss attributes that Shadow uses to model the path charac-
teristics. We use the Internet graph of Jansen et al. [12],
a complete graph that specifies latency and packet loss
rates between every pair of vertices. However, we made
some modifications because it did not contain accurate
packet loss rates on edges. We did not find a good
source of Internet packet loss rates, and so we created
a model where packet loss corresponds to the latency
of an edge. First, we reduced the maximum latency al-
lowed on a single edge to 300 milliseconds to remove
long-tail outliers. Second, we set packet loss rates on
the edges in the complete graph according to the follow-
ing linear function of the latency of the edge (in mil-
liseconds): packetloss ← latency/(300)(1.5%). Note
that constructing an updated and more accurate graph for
Shadow simulation is outside the scope of this paper, but
is a problem that future work should consider.
4.2 Experiments
Using the private Tor network described above, we ran
Shadow experiments with both the AMAP and the KIST
socket scheduling policies that were described in Sec-
tion 3. For the KIST experiments, the socket scheduler
was configured to run every 10 milliseconds, as previous
work has shown this to provide good performance [12].
Additionally, we experimented with the following vari-
ants on the previously described base network.
Traffic load: We varied the base network to understand
how network load affects KIST: we created low load
and high load network variants by removing and adding
19,600 clients, respectively.
Packet loss: We varied the base Internet model to un-
derstand how packet loss rates affect KIST: we created a
no loss model with all packet loss rates set to 0, and we
created a high loss model with packet loss rates double
that of the base model (to a maximum of 3%).
We ran 10 experiments in total: one for AMAP and
one for KIST for the base network as well as each of
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Figure 3: Client and relay performance aggregated across clients and relays for our varying traffic load models.
the four variants. Each experiment consumed between
0.5 and 1 TiB of RAM and simulated 45 minutes of
full network activity in 6 to 8 days running on our hard-
ware. We collected client download times, and we instru-
mented our relays to collect goodput information (using
existing Tor control port mechanisms), Tor cell queuing
times (using a cell tracing patch we developed), and ker-
nel queuing times (with a Shadow patch).
4.3 Results
We evaluate and compare KIST and AMAP across a va-
riety of different performance metrics.
Effects of Traffic Load: The performance effects of
traffic load on AMAP (solid lines) and KIST (non-solid
lines) are shown in Figure 3, where the line colors indi-
cate the low, normal, and high load models.
Client performance is shown in Figures 3a-3c as the
time to reach the first and last byte for all completed
client downloads, across the low, regular, and high traf-
fic load models. We make three major observations from
these results. First, when there is low traffic load on the
network, clients download times are generally unaffected
by the choice of scheduling policy (all of the blue lines in
3a-3c showing download times under low packet loss are
roughly overlapping). Second, download times increase
across all scheduling policies as the load on the network
increases, but the increase is greater for AMAP than for
KIST (i.e., downloads with KIST finish more quickly
than those with AMAP as load increases). Third, client
performance when using KIST is no worse and generally
much better than when using AMAP, but the improve-
ment over AMAP diminishes as download size increases
and the EWMA circuit scheduler’s priority mechanisms
become effective at preferring lower-throughput flows.
Relay performance is shown in Figures 3d-3f. Fig-
ure 3d shows that aggregate Tor network goodput per
second is higher when using both scheduling policies as
the network load increases, matching intuition. Good-
put increases over AMAP when using KIST as network
load increases, but the improvement that KIST provides
is most significant on the highest-load model that we
tested. Figure 3e shows that KIST generally reduces ker-
nel queue time by more than it increases Tor queue time
as shown in Figure 3f, suggesting that KIST is capable of
reducing congestion overall rather than simply relocating
it. Note that Tor queue time in Figure 3f is nearly zero
for AMAP across all three load models, as Tor writes as
much as possible to the kernel and tends to not queue
data in the application layer. Also note that the sharp el-
bow at 10 milliseconds for KIST is due to the configured
interval in which the scheduler is run.
Effects of Packet Loss: The performance effects of
packet loss for AMAP (solid lines) and KIST (non-solid
lines) are shown in Figure 4, where the line colors indi-
cate the no, normal, and high packet loss models.
Client performance is shown in Figures 4a-4c. Re-
call that the general trend with the varying load mod-
els was that KIST and AMAP both reduced client per-
formance as load increased, but the reduction when us-
ing KIST was less than when using AMAP. However,
the general trend when varying packet loss is a bit dif-
ferent. When no packet loss is present, similar perfor-
mance is achieved with both AMAP and KIST. However,
as packet loss increases, AMAP tends to worsen low-
6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time to First Byte (s)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(a) All Clients
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time to Last Byte (s)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(b) 320 KiB Clients
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time to Last Byte (s)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(c) 5 MiB Clients
2200 2400 2600 2800 3000 3200
Goodput (MiB/s)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(d) All Relays
101 102 103 104
Kernel Outbound Queue Time (ms)
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(e) All Relays
10−2 10−1 100 101 102 103
Tor Application Queue Time (ms)
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
Fr
ac
tio
n
amap-none
kist-none
amap
kist
amap-high
kist-high
(f) All Relays
Figure 4: Client and relay performance aggregated across clients and relays for our varying packet loss models.
volume client performance while KIST tends to improve
it. Figure 4a and 4b both show that KIST actually per-
forms best with high packet loss while AMAP performs
worst, while Figure 4c shows similar results as for vary-
ing load: the improvement diminishes for 5 MiB down-
loads since the circuit priority mechanism is operating
effectively. We suspect that KIST achieves better perfor-
mance for low-volume traffic at higher packet loss rates
because it effectively deprioritizes high-volume circuits;
the less-congested kernel can then react more quickly to
low-volume traffic as Tor prioritizes its delivery to the
kernel. More work is needed to verify this suspicion.
Relay performance is shown in Figures 4d-4f. Fig-
ure 4d shows that aggregate Tor network goodput de-
creases as packet loss increases, but it decreases less
when using KIST than when using AMAP. Figure 4e
shows again that KIST is able to reduce kernel queue
time more as packet loss rates increase, while AMAP in-
creases kernel queue times as packet loss rates increase.
Finally, the general trends in Figure 4f are similar that
of the Tor queue times under the varying load models:
Tor queue time is nearly zero when using AMAP for all
tested loss models, while it is 10 milliseconds or less for
over 80 percent of the data when using KIST.
5 Live Network Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate KIST by running it on a live
relay in the public Tor network.
5.1 Deploying KIST
The KIST scheduling decisions are all local to each relay,
and function independent of the other relays in a circuit.
As a result, KIST is naturally incrementally deployable.
This allows us to deploy KIST on a single relay under our
control in the public Tor network to further understand its
real-world performance effects.
We ran a Tor exit relay5 with the default exit policy on
a bare-metal machine rented from Hurricane Electric (an
Internet service provider). The machine had a 4-core/8-
thread intel Xeon E3-1230 v5 CPU running at 3.40 GHz,
and was connected to a unmetered access link capable of
a symmetric bandwidth of 1 Gbit/s (2 Gbit/s combined
transmit and receive). Several unrelated relays were co-
hosted on the machine, but the average combined daily
bandwidth used did not exceed 1.5 Gbit/s.
We ran our relay for several weeks before starting a
2 day experiment where we ran KIST and AMAP for
one day each. During this experiment, we also ran three
web clients that download 320 KiB files and pause an
average of 60 seconds between downloads, and two bulk
clients that download 5 MiB files and pause for 1 sec-
ond between downloads. The clients choose new entry
and middle relays for every circuit, but we pin our relay
as the exit. As in the Shadow simulations in Section 4,
we instrumented our relay to collect goodput, Tor cell
queuing times, and kernel queuing times, and we instru-
mented our clients to collect file download times.
5.2 Results
During our experiment, the web clients finished 7,770
downloads and the bulk clients finished 18,989 down-
loads. Figure 5 shows the distributions of download
times recorded by our clients. While KIST reduced
5The relay fingerprint was 0xBCCB362660.
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Figure 5: Client performance aggregated across five clients downloading through the live Tor network.
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Figure 6: Tor relay performance on our fast exit relay running in the live Tor network.
download times relative to AMAP across all metrics, the
relative improvement was greater for 320 KiB files (Fig-
ure 5b) than for 5 MiB files (Figure 5c); this could indi-
cate that circuit priority was more effective under KIST,
although we note that there may be network effects out-
side of our control that are also influencing the results.
Figure 6 shows the performance results collected on
our relay. Figure 6a shows that KIST increased goodput
relative to AMAP during our observational period. Al-
though Figure 6b shows an insignificant change in ker-
nel outbound queue time, Figure 6c shows that KIST in-
creased Tor application queuing time by less than 10 mil-
liseconds (the configured scheduling interval) for over 90
percent of the sampled cells; we suspect that the rel-
atively higher Tor queue time for the remaining sam-
pled cells is due to the circuit scheduler effectively de-
prioritizing high-volume circuits. Additionally, KIST re-
duced the worst case application queue times from over
2,000 milliseconds to less than 400 milliseconds.
We also collected the overhead of performing the
getsockopt(2) call to retrieve TCP information for
write-pending sockets. We observed that the median
number of write-pending sockets that accumulated dur-
ing a 10 millisecond period was 23 (with min=1, q1=18,
q3=27, and max=127), while the median amount of
time to collect TCP information on all write-pending
sockets was 23 microseconds (with min=1, q1=17,
q3=33, and max=674). We observed a linear relation-
ship between the amount of time required to collect TCP
information on all write-pending sockets and the number
of such sockets (1.08 microseconds per pending socket),
independent of the total number of open sockets. There-
fore, we believe that the KIST overhead, with our opti-
mization of only collecting TCP information on pending
sockets, should be tolerable to run in the main thread for
even the fastest Tor relay.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we implemented KIST with a goal of de-
ploying it into the Tor network. We evaluated its per-
formance impact in simulation under a range of network
load and packet loss conditions, and found that KIST can
improve client and relay performance, particularly when
a relay is under high load or high packet loss. We also
ran KIST in the public Tor network, and found that KIST
has an indistinguishable effect on relay throughput and
kernel queuing times. We will release our implementa-
tion as open-source software so that it can be included in
a future Tor release.
Lessons Learned: As with most Tor research, we found
it useful to communicate with the Tor developers early
and often. They are experts in developing and maintain-
ing anonymous communication systems and their collab-
oration and feedback greatly improved the quality of this
work. Still, we found it to be extremely time-consuming
to produce a working implementation given the complex-
ities of both the Tor software and the way that it inter-
operates with TCP and the kernel. We advise those in-
terested in deploying Tor research to carefully compare
the costs and benefits of creating new knowledge through
additional research with those of deploying previous re-
search proposals.
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Future Work: Future work should consider creating up-
dated data-driven models of latency and packet loss rates
between relays that would be useful to Tor experimen-
tation tools like Shadow. This could be done using di-
rect measurement with RIPE Atlas probes or tools like
Ting [7]. More work is also needed to verify our simu-
lation findings that KIST is capable of increasingly im-
proving performance for low-volume traffic under high
load and packet loss rates in the public Tor network.
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